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THE TRANSFORMATION OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS:
PER SE ILLEGALITY, THE RULE OF REASON,
AND PER SE LEGALITY
D. DANIEL SOKOL*
Robert Bork probably had the single most lasting influence on antitrust law
and policy of anyone in the past 50 years.1 To read the 1978 Antitrust Para-
dox2 today, one is struck by how closely contemporary case law tracks Bork’s
policy prescriptions.3 The speed at which the transformation in law and policy
occurred in antitrust is perhaps unprecedented across any area of common
law.4 In the 1970s, antitrust jurisprudence and enforcement policies were in
* Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law; Senior Research Fellow, George
Washington University Law School Competition Law Center. I wish to thank Lee Greenfield,
Josh Soven, and conference participants at Yale Law School for their feedback, as well as the
University of Florida for a summer research grant.
1 The tension of the then competing goals of antitrust—promoting efficiency and protecting
smaller firms—in academic and policy circles shaped Bork’s writing and advocacy. Bork be-
lieved that the Supreme Court (and implicitly lower courts) showed hostility to business and that
this approach to antitrust law needed to change. Cf. Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn
Overruled, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 171, 172 [hereinafter Bork, Vertical Restraints].
2 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) [here-
inafter BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX] .
3 For a recent overview of the state of the antitrust economics literature, see generally OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol
eds., forthcoming 2014). Bork’s understanding of economics needs to be judged by what was
known both theoretically and empirically at the time he wrote since there have been significant
developments in antitrust economics since the publication of The Antitrust Paradox. Bork’s un-
derstanding of antitrust came from Chicago scholarship of Ward S. Bowman, Jr. , The Prerequi-
sites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 (1955); Aaron Director &
Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (1956); John S.
McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958);
George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964); Lester G. Telser, Why
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). The Chicago approach
stood in contrast to some contemporaries. See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and other Non-
Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); MILTON HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN
PERSPECTIVE: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF RULE AND DISCRETION (1957).
4 The closest similar shift was in the area of government regulation where, starting in the late
1970s, there was a shift from price regulation to market-based regulation. See generally BARAK
Y. ORBACH, REGULATION: WHY AND HOW THE STATE REGULATES (2012).
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tension with industrial organization economics. Bork created a unified goal
for antitrust based on a “consumer welfare prescription” to shape the develop-
ment of the case law.5 The shaping of U.S. antitrust law to fit Bork’s con-
sumer welfare prescription is all the more interesting given that although Bork
was not the first to argue that antitrust analysis should focus on industrial
organization based economic analysis, he was the first to package these be-
liefs in an easy-to-understand manner that the courts could implement.6 While
many of Bork’s ideas are mainstream now, at the time of publication his writ-
ing was highly contentious and the notion of an economics-based consumer-
welfare antitrust standard was very controversial.
This essay describes Bork’s policy objectives for the antitrust treatment of
vertical restraints, explains why Bork had such a disproportionate influence
on the subject, and tracks Bork’s influence on the development of vertical
restraints in three specific areas: maximum resale price maintenance (RPM);
vertical territorial restrictions; and Robinson-Patman Act violations. In prac-
tice, the shift in the antitrust rules applied to these areas has not been from per
se illegality to the rule of reason, but has been a more dramatic shift from per
se illegality to presumptive legality under the rule of reason.7
I. BORK AS THE CATALYST FOR ANTITRUST’S SHIFT ON
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
A. BORK’S ANTITRUST PRESCRIPTION REGARDING VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Bork differed from the other antitrust reformers in his approach to vertical
restraints. In his seminal article, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division Part II, Bork advocated for per se legality
for vertical restraints.8 He reiterated this call for per se legality for vertical
5 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 66.
6 Bork had a greater effect on the development of antitrust law than his Chicago contempo-
raries who used economic analysis, even though Bork’s work was less economically sophisti-
cated. Compare the impact of Richard A. Posner’s Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective
(1976) with The Antitrust Paradox.
7 The three areas studied are unlike more complex vertical restraints such as exclusive deal-
ing, tying, and certain pricing practices (e.g., bundling and loyalty discounts). The three vertical
restraints selected tend not to require the difficult balancing of efficiencies versus potential to
exclude as much as other vertical restraints, which makes the latter more challenging to analyze.
Hence, these three areas are those that are most likely to be able to shift to per se legality in
practice.
8 Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division—Part II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 391 (1966) (“[A]ll vertical market division and price fixing
should be lawful regardless of the parties’ market size.”); see also Bork, Vertical Restraints,
supra note 1, at 173 (“[V]ertical restraints are, in economic terms, all of a piece. There are no
distinctions to be made among them. They should be either all illegal per se or unqualified
lawful. But legal doctrine is not in line with economic reality . . . .”); id. at 182.
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restraints in The Antitrust Paradox.9 In contrast, most others advocating re-
form of the treatment of vertical restraints favored applying the rule of reason
and believed that certain vertical conduct violated the antitrust laws.10
Bork’s vision for per se legality for vertical restraints has been realized, at
least partially. For several types of vertical restraints, the rule of reason has in
practice meant near per se legality, with a negative safe harbor for particularly
egregious behavior.
B. BORK AND THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ANTITRUST
Bork’s advocacy of his approach to how to “fix” antitrust connects to the
concept of the efficiency of the common law. Richard Posner was the first to
9 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 288 (“Analysis shows that every vertical
restraint should be completely lawful.”). Bork advocated this approach earlier than Easterbrook
or Posner. See Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distri-
bution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrange-
ments and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 158 (1984).
Bork was a bit disingenuous in stating that he was against all vertical restraints. Bork believed
that Lorain Journal was correctly decided. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951); BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra, at 344–46. In that case, the monopolist daily news-
paper in the town of Lorain, Ohio, refused ads by advertisers who also placed ads with Lorain
Journal’s only other potential media rivals, the local radio stations. The Supreme Court held that
“forcing advertisers to boycott a competing radio station violated § 2.” Lorain Journal, 342 U.S.
at 152. For Bork, Lorain Journal’s intent was predatory, as it wanted to bankrupt the radio
stations and gain their FCC licenses. He also noted that there was no efficiency justification for
Lorain Journal’s behavior. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra, at 345.
Even after the publication of The Antitrust Paradox, Bork found similar situations that had
vertical elements that raised legitimate antitrust concern. The key to understanding why certain
vertical behavior still deserved antitrust scrutiny and not automatic per se legal condemnation
had to do with efficiencies. Bork was critical in the exclusive dealing context of the Supreme
Court’s “excessively harsh” treatment (e.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258
U.S. 346 (1922); United States v. Griffith; 334 U.S. 100 (1948); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertis-
ing Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953)) because the Court’s understanding of foreclosure arguments
gave insufficient (if any) weight to efficiencies. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra, at 304–08.
Specifically, Bork argued, “The advantage of the contract must be the creation of efficiency, and
[there are] a variety of efficiencies that such contracts may create.” Id. at 304–05.
Bork found Microsoft’s behavior troubling from an antitrust perspective in terms of exclusion.
In the DOJ case against Microsoft, the troubling behavior was that Microsoft required that origi-
nal equipment manufacturers, vendors of software, and Internet service providers exclusively
carry Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. Bork likened Microsoft’s behavior to that of Lorain Journal,
arguing that Microsoft was a monopolist that lacked an efficiency justification for its exclusion-
ary conduct. Robert Bork, Op-Ed, What Antitrust Is All About, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at A19.
Though Microsoft tried to hire Bork, Bork consulted for Netscape in the case. Harry First, Bork
and Microsoft: Why Bork Was Right and What We Learn About Judging Exclusionary Behavior,
infra this issue, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1017, 1019 n.7 (2014).
10 See, e.g., POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 171 (“Some economists believe that it
is virtually impossible for a firm or group of firms ever to exclude competitors or potential
competitors from the market unless they have lower costs. . . . I do not share this view. ”).
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hypothesize that the common law led to more efficient legal rules.11 The ex-
planation for the efficiency of the common law is that when a judge makes an
incorrect ruling, an economically disadvantaged party will challenge the rule
because the disadvantage is greater than the advantage to the beneficiary of
the rule. Antitrust, which is a broad statutory regime governed by common
law, fits within the efficiency of the common law paradigm.12 As a result, with
advances in economic knowledge, antitrust law shifts to more efficient legal
rules over time, as disadvantaged parties challenge inefficient rules and use
economic analysis to change them.13
Antitrust jurisprudence and economic analysis in the 1950s and 1960s was
hostile to procompetitive interpretations of vertical restraints.14 Starting with
Donald Turner, some have called this antitrust’s “inhospitality tradition.”15
Bork’s contribution to transforming antitrust’s inhospitality tradition was to
increase the shift to more efficient rules, especially in those areas of greatest
inefficiency of legal rules (maximum RPM, territorial restrictions, and Robin-
son-Patman).
Bork was successful in transforming antitrust, relative to Posner and other
antitrust reformers of the era, because Bork promised that, through the use of
11 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972); see also Paul Rubin,
Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) (formally modeling the effi-
ciency of the common law).
12 See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common
Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982); William H. Page, The Chicago
School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Suffi-
ciency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1226–27 (1989).
13 Of course, the change is not instant and so one might question how efficient the common
law is if there is a long enough lag time.
14 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, and
Efficiency, supra this issue, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 983, 988 (2014) (“While Bork exaggerated the
degree of hostility toward vertical integration prior to the 1930s, by the time he was writing in
the 1950s, both the economic theory and the law had become far more critical . . . .”).
15 Alan J. Meese, Market Power and Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory
Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1322 & n.124 (2013). The
original citation is to Turner’s speech to the Antitrust Section of the New York State Bar Associ-
ation in which Turner said, “I approach customer and territorial restrictions not hospitably in the
common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust.” Oliver E. Williamson,
Mergers, Acquisitions and Leveraged Buyouts: An Efficiency Assessment, in CORPORATE LAW
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1, 21 n.24 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk ed., 1990) (citing Stanley Robinson,
N.Y. State Bar Association Antitrust Symposium 1968 at 29.).
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simple rules16 and a straightforward singular goal of antitrust,17 antitrust doc-
trine and practice could be improved.18 He did so through a clear and accessi-
ble writing style that fused Harvard School considerations of administrability
and legal process with Chicago School economic-based analysis19—a factor
that made it possible for judges to easily process and apply Bork’s writing.
The mix of the two traditions promoted the case law shift.20
Bork’s writing was brilliant in using clear prose21 to make points that were
sometimes analytically deceptive. Bork convincingly made the seemingly
counterintuitive case that abandoning per se illegality for the rule of reason
would simplify antitrust. Bork understood that, in practice, the push to rule of
reason would actually lead to presumptive or even per se legality. Because the
details of particular practices matter for a rule of reason analysis, the shift to
rule of reason creates various evidentiary hurdles for plaintiffs and increases
the cost of litigation. The use of the rule of reason would thereby serve as a
16 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 72 (“The need of the law generally is for the
systematic development of normative models of judicial behavior, models which, while they
cannot attain, will at least distantly approach the rigor of the descriptive models of basic eco-
nomic theory. Until we have such models, criticism of the courts for having the wrong goals will
generally be empty, the mere assertion of a different set of personal preferences.”).
17 Id. at 7, 50; Robert Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly: The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 242 (1967); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of
the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
18 In fact, economic analysis of antitrust is not simple nor was there ever a single goal. See,
e.g., Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare
Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471 (2013); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Funda-
mental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 191 (2008). Bork wrote that the sole goal of antitrust was consumer welfare, largely be-
cause “consumer” was an easier sell to a broader audience in terms of the goal (as the 1960s and
1970s saw the birth of the consumer movement). However, by consumer welfare, Bork meant
total welfare. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 91. For a discussion of the
meaning of Bork and goals of antitrust, see Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare
Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2011). Bork merely appropriated the word con-
sumer because it was easier for courts to understand this concept. Many courts, including the
Supreme Court, continue to confuse consumer and total welfare in their antitrust jurisprudence.
Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic
Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 473 (2012). For an analysis of the shift in the rule of reason,
see Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of
Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2012).
19 See Thomas C. Arthur, The Influence of Levi’s Legal Process on Bork’s Antitrust Paradox,
17 MISS. C. L. REV. 124 (1996); James May, Redirecting the Future: Law and the Future and the
Seeds of Change in Modern Antitrust Law, 17 MISS. C. L. REV. 43, 73–78 (1996).
20 William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U. S. Competition Law for Dominant
Firm Behavior: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 14 (2007).
21 Many theorists in the economics tradition lacked Bork’s prose or his almost religious fervor
for the correctness of his position. See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 285
(“Antitrust is capable of sustaining meaningless distinctions and sterile paradoxes, but those of
Schwinn were too many and too obvious to persist for long.”); id. at 382 (“[The Robinson-
Patman Act is] the misshapen progeny of intolerable draftsmanship coupled with wholly mis-
taken economic theory.”).
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screen to weed out weaker cases in which there was an efficiency justification
for the restraint.
Bork also benefited from good timing: his influence is partially attributable
to the publication date of The Antitrust Paradox. The book was mostly ready
for publication by 1969, but it was delayed because of the illness of Bork’s
first wife and his appointment as Solicitor General. As a result, the book was
published in 1978, just as the Chicago shift began in the Supreme Court.
Bork’s position as Solicitor General allowed the Supreme Court to get to
know Bork well, which likely gave Bork’s writing greater credence.22 It also
allowed Bork to train and influence many of the attorneys who would argue
before the Supreme Court for the next generation.
Bork’s policy prescriptions became part of formal government policy start-
ing in the Reagan administration.23 This led to a significant decline in federal
enforcement against vertical restraints. Government challenges to vertical
practices (and civil non-merger cases in general) have never recovered to pre-
Reagan levels.24
II. STRUCTURAL SHIFTS IN THE CASE LAW ON
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
The Chicago School’s impact on vertical restraints and business behavior
was uneven. Certain types of conduct, such as exclusive dealing, continued to
receive significant scrutiny. But in three areas—maximum RPM, non-price
restraints, and Robinson-Patman Act violations, Bork’s writing (and advocacy
in front of the Supreme Court in the case of Robinson-Patman) helped cause
the case law to push aside per se illegality rules in favor of de facto per se
legality. The result was more aggressive vertical behavior by businesses, as
they realized that there was little legal risk to conduct that previously had
been per se unlawful.25
22 George L. Priest, Bork’s Strategy: Price Fixing, and the Influence of the Chicago School on
Modern Antitrust Law, 57 J.L. & ECON (forthcoming 2014), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2367028.
23 See Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics and Enforcement, 7 J. COM-
PETITION L. & ECON. 733, 736 (2011).
24 Id.
25 This suggests Bork’s work has had even more influence than is reflected in the case law
alone. However, direct demonstrations of these changes are difficult. Consequently, this essay
identifies Bork’s influence on possible correlations between shifts in business behavior and shifts
in case law by examining the empirical work on vertical contracting specific to the doctrinal
shifts discussed.
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A. MAXIMUM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The origins of per se illegality for maximum RPM emerged from Socony
Vacuum.26 In that case, Justice Douglas created an expansive per se rule that
prohibited “raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce.”27 The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the per se prohibition through dicta in Kiefer-Stewart, which involved
liquor dealers and maximum prices.28
These cases served as precursors to one of the worst antitrust decisions of
the past 50 years. In 1968, the Supreme Court held maximum RPM to be per
se illegal in Albrecht v. Herald Co.29 The Court reasoned that suppliers may
choose the wrong price.30 The Court also showed concern that maximum
RPM could easily become a minimum price and lead to collusion.31
Case law began to chip away at the Albrecht per se rule in Atlantic Rich-
field Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. (ARCO).32 In its ARCO decision, the Court did
not overturn Albrecht,33 but noted that it might be willing to overturn Albrecht
if the question were to come before it.34 In doing so, the Court noted the
scholarship of Bork and others that was critical of per se rules for maximum
RPM.35
In State Oil Co. v. Khan,36 the Supreme Court did overturn Albrecht, and
made maximum RPM subject to the rule of reason. The Supreme Court found
that the maximum profit margin agreement should not have been held per se
illegal. In doing so, it relied on Bork’s analysis of Albrecht and cited The
Antitrust Paradox for the proposition that “[t]here could, of course, be no
anticonsumer effect from [the type of price fixing considered in Albrecht], and
one suspects that the paper has a legitimate interest in keeping subscriber
26 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
27 Id. at 223.
28 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (“[Maxi-
mum RPM may] cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrict their ability to sell in accor-
dance with their own judgment.”), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
29 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). The reasoning
behind the Albrecht decision was flawed. See Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht
Rule After Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123 (1998); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981).
30 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152.
31 Id. at 153.
32 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
33 Id. at 335 n.5.
34 Id. at 343 n.15.
35 Id.
36 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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prices down in order to increase circulation and maximize revenues from
advertising.”37
Since State Oil, there is little antitrust risk in implementing maximum
RPM. There have been over 225 federal decided antitrust keycited cases that
have cited State Oil.38 Of these, nearly all citations to State Oil are for the
broad proposition that State Oil stands for the applicability of the rule of rea-
son. Only six cases dealt with actual claims of maximum RPM. Four cases
were decided in favor of the defendant based on the facts and two on antitrust
injury grounds. No cases have held for the plaintiff.39
B. NON-PRICE VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS
Early vertical non-price case law made economic sense. In White Motor
Co. v. United States,40 the “first case involving a territorial restriction in a
vertical arrangement,”41 the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to ex-
clusive territories that a manufacturer assigned to its distributors and dealers.
The Court stated that it applied the rule of reason because “[w]e do not know
enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements
emerge to be certain.”42
This victory for economic sense was short-lived. Only four years later, in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,43 the Court revisited whether vertical
non-price restraints should be analyzed as per se unlawful or under the rule of
reason. The Court held the territorial restrictions per se illegal based on the
rationale that they impeded the economic viability of small (and often ineffi-
cient) businesses.44 Bork’s harsh response was that “Schwinn’s result was not
only wrong, but its rationale verged on mere wittiness.”45
37 Id. at 16.
38 The results come from a Westlaw search conducted in August 2013.
39 The paucity of cases suggests that maximum RPM cases never should have been per se
illegal. That some cases were decided on antitrust injury grounds provides evidence to support
the theoretical claim made first by Blair and Lang in 1991 (before State Oil) that “[i]t is readily
apparent that the victim of maximum resale price fixing has not suffered antitrust injury.” Roger
D. Blair & Gordon L. Lang, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale Price Fixing Moves To-
ward the Rule of Reason, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1007, 1021 (1991).
40 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
41 Id. at 261.
42 Id. at 263.
43 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977).
44 Id. at 382 (“Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted with domin-
ion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the product
may be transferred—whether by explicit agreement or by silent combination or understanding
with his vendee—is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
45 Bork, Vertical Restraints, supra note 1, at 172.
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A decade later, the Supreme Court overturned Schwinn in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.46 The Court held that non-price restrictions would be
analyzed under the rule of reason. In doing so, the Sylvania Court relied heav-
ily on Bork (five citations to his work) to recognize that non-price restrictions
enhanced interbrand competition from manufacturer efficiencies created by
vertical restraints.47
Sylvania specifically addressed territorial restrictions, but it also signaled a
broad shift across all of antitrust to the use of the rule of reason instead of per
se illegality for conduct that did not involve horizontal price agreements. Bork
made just such an argument shortly after Sylvania. He explained:
Sylvania holds the promise of fundamental reform, not only in the law of
vertical restraints but in antitrust generally. The present misshapen look of
antitrust doctrine is due in large measure to the Supreme Court’s habit of
regarding business efficiency as either irrelevant or harmful. . . . The Court’s
Sylvania opinion not only counted efficiencies in favor of a challenged busi-
ness practice but did so in a sophisticated way, perceiving that the elimina-
tion or mitigation of competition among a manufacturer’s dealers was
essential to the achievement of certain distributional efficiencies. Moreover,
in resting its decision on those grounds, the Court necessarily accepted the
premise that the antitrust laws are, primarily if not solely, concerned with
consumer welfare.48
In an analysis of cases decided through 1991, Judge Douglas Ginsburg ex-
amined all federal appellate decisions that cited Sylvania on the merits. He
found that defendants succeeded more than 90 percent of the time.49 Ginsburg
concluded that the law had moved to de facto per se legality where the con-
duct of a monopolist is not at issue. This work has not been updated in a
manner that breaks down cases in the same way, although Michael Carrier
finds that in 84 percent of all rule of reason cases (1977–1999), the plaintiff
cannot show an anticompetitive effect;50 likewise, in the following 20 years
46 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
47 Id. at 56, 66–69 nn.8–10. The majority cited to his work as authority as an “economist”
regarding promoting intrabrand competition for efficient distribution, on the limitations of
Schwinn (in the concurrence by Justice White), twice on the goal of economic efficiency in
antitrust (in the concurrence by Justice White), and on how the procompetitive justifications of
exclusive territories also apply in the case of RPM (in the concurrence by Justice White).
48 Bork, Vertical Restraints, supra note 1, at 172. Even though Sylvania signaled an important
change to a more efficient rule, in the immediate period after Sylvania its importance remained
controversial in the lower courts, in part because Sylvania’s market share was a mere 5 percent at
the time of trial, suggesting that it lacked the market power necessary to cause anticompetitive
effects. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 38.
49 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71 (1992).
50 Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV.
1267, 1268; see also Shantanu Dutta et al., Vertical Territorial Restrictions and Public Policy:
Theories and Industry Evidence, 63 J. MARKETING 121 (1999) (tracking business marketing and
distribution decisions regarding territorial restrictions through the use of survey data to measure
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(1999–2009), the plaintiff shows no anticompetitive effect in 97 percent of
rule of reason cases.51
C. ROBINSON-PATMAN
Bork described the Robinson-Patman Act52 as “antitrust’s least glorious
hour.”53 The Act’s original name—“Wholesale Grocer’s Protection Act” was
an indication of its protectionist nature.54 The Supreme Court also has noted
the purpose of the Act:
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly
clear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure
a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large
buyer’s quantity purchasing ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed
to deprive a large buyer of such advantages . . . .55
At the time Bork first wrote about vertical restraints, the antitrust agencies
(and private plaintiffs) used Robinson-Patman aggressively to prevent
procompetitive price discrimination.56 Case law at the time of Bork’s writing
was hostile to procompetitive justifications for both primary line and secon-
dary line price discrimination.57
Bork attacked Robinson-Patman because price discrimination could be
good for competition.58 Robinson-Patman denied the benefits of scale econo-
the effects of Sylvania and finding that “business efficiency considerations play a significant role
in the decision to use territorial restrictions”).
51 Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009).
52 15 U.S.C. § 13.
53 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 382.
54 D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions that Benefit Special
Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 128 (2009).
55 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948).
56 Some of the criticisms of Robinson-Patman were longstanding. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 132 (1955) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT]; AMERICAN BAR ASS’N,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 67–68 (Sept. 15,
1969); RICHARD POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFER-
ENCES (1976); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT (1977). The criticism of Robinson-Patman has continued to the present. See ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 317–26 (2007) (calling for repeal
of the Robinson-Patman Act), available at govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/
amc_final_report.pdf.
57 The two most prevalent types of Robinson-Patman claims are primary line injury (primary
because the injury to competition stems from other sellers being injured by the discriminatory
discount of a seller) and secondary line injury (secondary because the injury to competition
stems from seller’s disfavored customers’ injury vis-a`-vis the favored customer of the seller).
58 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 394–98; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished Business, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 143–44
(2000).
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mies to buyers. As a result, consumer prices were higher than what they
would have been without the Act.59
In the pre-Antitrust Paradox era, the most important primary line Robin-
son-Patman case was Utah Pie,60 a decision that Bork strongly criticized.61
The case alleged a coordinated pricing scheme by three large national firms
against a local firm that reduced the price of pies. The Supreme Court found
for the plaintiff Utah Pie, even though such an outcome favored a competitor
over consumers.62 As a result of the case, inefficient competitors could defend
themselves against more efficient competitors by using Robinson-Patman.
Secondary line injury cases were equally problematic. The seminal pre-
Antitrust Paradox case in this area was Morton Salt.63 Based on an assumption
that price discrimination led to adverse competitive effects, the Supreme
Court, without any showing of actual consumer harm, condemned the volume
discount price discrimination used by Morton Salt.64
Brooke Group marked the end of plaintiffs’ victories in primary line
cases.65 Brooke Group, a small competitor, sued Brown & Williamson under
Robinson-Patman for primary-line price discrimination, alleging both discrim-
inatory and below cost discounts. The Supreme Court held that for a plaintiff
to prevail, (1) the defendant’s price must be below some measure of its costs,
and (2) the defendant must have a reasonable prospect of recoupment of its
below-cost price losses.66 The recoupment prong eviscerated the Utah Pie
standard and made it nearly impossible in practice for plaintiffs to win a pri-
mary line Robinson-Patman claim going forward. Doctrinally, the case is im-
portant because it led to a structural shift in primary line Robinson-Patman
case outcomes.
59 For an analysis, see DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 675 (4th ed. 2005); Roger D. Blair & Christina DePasquale, “Antitrust’s Least Glo-
rious Hour”: The Robinson-Patman Act, 57 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2014), available at
sitemaker.umich.edu/depasquale/files/depasquale_jle_2014.pdf.
60 Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
61 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 387 (“There is no economic theory worthy of
the name that could find an injury to competition on the facts of the case. Defendants were
convicted not of injuring competition but, quite simply, of competing.”).
62 Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 703 (“We believe that the Act reaches price discrimination that erodes
competition as much as it does price discrimination that is intended to have immediate destruc-
tive impact. ”). For an in-depth analysis, see Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, Utah Pie
and the Consequences of Robinson-Patman, 21 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1978); see also Ward S.
Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967).
63 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
64 Id. at 46–47.
65 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
66 Id. at 222–23.
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Unlike primary line case outcomes, secondary line cases did not experience
a significant shift until Volvo.67 In Volvo, there were two core issues regarding
secondary-line price discrimination. In the first, the Court held that under the
Robinson-Patman Act a manufacturer was not liable for secondary-line price
discrimination without a showing by plaintiffs that the manufacturer contem-
poraneously discriminated between dealers that competed in reselling the
manufacturer’s product to the identical retail customer. The Court’s second
holding was that the plaintiff dealer did not establish injury to competition.68
The Court, citing directly to Bork’s scholarship and indirectly to Bork by
relying on Sylvania, reasoned that “we would resist interpretation geared more
to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of
competition.”69
Radical changes in the level of government enforcement activity of the Act
added to the decline in private cases. Under the Kennedy and Johnson admin-
istrations, 518 Robinson-Patman cases were brought;70 in the 1965–1968 pe-
riod, the FTC undertook 97 Robinson-Patman investigations a year and issued
an average of 27 complaints a year during that period.71 The Carter adminis-
tration brought just eight Robinson-Patman Act cases. As a result, federal
agency Robinson-Patman enforcement is dead, with only one government
case brought since 1992.72 Moreover, by the mid 1970s the Department of
67 Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006).
68 “[T]here is no evidence that any favored purchaser possesses market power, the allegedly
favored purchasers are dealers with little resemblance to large independent department stores or
chain operations, and the supplier’s selective price discounting fosters competition among sup-
pliers of different brands. By declining to extend Robinson-Patman’s governance to such cases,
we continue to construe the Act ‘consistently with broader policies of the antitrust laws.’ ” Id.
(internal citation omitted). All, however, is not totally resolved regarding secondary line injury
cases and it is still possible to run afoul of Robinson-Patman post-Volvo. See Barbara O.
Bruckmann, Volvo Seven Years Later: Williams v. Duke Energy International, Inc., ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Feb. 2013, www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/feb13_
bruckmann_2_26f.authcheckdam.pdf. Additional case refinement (or ideally repeal of the stat-
ute) is still required.
69 Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 181.
70 William E. Kovacic, Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 411 (2003). Nor was Robinson-Patman even effective at reaching its goal of
helping small competitors. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 516 (1990) (“[T]he brunt of the Commission’s effort fell upon
the same businesses Congress sought to protect.”).
71 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 56, at 316.
72 Decision and Order, McCormick & Co., FTC Docket No. C-3939 (May 2, 2000). The DOJ
ceded all Robinson-Patman enforcement to the FTC in the 1970s. See Thomas E. Kauper, The
Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL.
83, 99 (1990) (“[The DOJ] used its understanding with the FTC that the latter would be responsi-
ble for government enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act to avoid any involvement under a
statute it thought economically unwise.”).
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Justice unilaterally refused to enforce Robinson-Patman and advocated for its
repeal.73 This constitutes a fundamental structural shift.74
The empirical scholarship on private Robinson-Patman decided cases
shows a significant shift in its use within the United States.75 One study that
collects 28 years of data from private Robinson-Patman decided cases finds a
shift in case frequency and in outcome starting in 1982.76 From 1982 to 1993
(up through Brooke Group), private plaintiffs were successful in 35 percent of
decided cases.77 In sharp contrast, in the 2006–2010 period (post-Volvo) the
success rate for plaintiffs decreased to less than 5 percent of the time in the 47
decided cases; none of those successes were in primary line Robinson-Patman
cases.78
If the decided cases are the close cases and/or they shape future business
behavior, this suggests that businesses have taken a more aggressive stance
regarding price discrimination than they did at the time of The Antitrust Para-
dox. This outcome may signal a shift to a pricing policy position risk assess-
ment of antitrust risk for Robinson-Patman that is closer to an outcome of per
se legality (or at the least presumptively legal), with a negative presumption
only in outlier cases.79
III. CONCLUSION
Robert Bork’s writing had a tremendous impact on the antitrust agencies’
enforcement policies and court decisions.80 Through elegant language, crafty
arguments, and good timing, Bork shifted standards of review for common
73 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 56.
74 Not all of the reasons behind  FTC enforcement activity numbers can be attributed to the
agency’s understanding of the economic irrationality of the Robinson-Patman Act. FTC priorities
shifted during this time. The FTC looked for big cases starting in the 1970s and big cases
“found” the FTC as firms filed mergers under Hart-Scott-Rodino. William E. Kovacic, Politics
and Partisanship in U.S. Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (2014).
75 First, a few caveats. Decided cases do not examine all cases filed nor do they examine
settlements between parties. However, the nature of the shift in the law affects settlement lever-
age as only those cases that are uncertain are likely to be litigated. George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–17 (1984). Moreover,
we cannot know what business practices have not been adopted due to vertical restrictions as
well as potential antitrust liability due to mixed horizontal and vertical restraints.
76 Ryan Luchs et al., The End of the Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data,
56 MGMT. SCI. 2123 (2010).
77 Id. at 2124.
78 Id.
79 Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber Prods. Co., 69 F. App’x 350 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
that Beech-Nut was able to properly state a claim for a case of below-cost predation); Wiegand
Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 2006 WL 847557, at 1–2 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (distin-
guishing the facts from those of Volvo).
80 See George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of The Antitrust Paradox, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 455 (2008).
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vertical restraints from per se illegality to a rule of reason. As shown, in prac-
tice, rule of reason treatment makes a number of these practices presumptively
legal. This presumptively legal rule of reason in combination with procedural
rules that benefit defendants brings certain antitrust conduct closer to Bork’s
stated goal of per se legality for vertical restraints. It remains to be seen if,
with more time, the Bork revolution will become complete with per se illegal-
ity eliminated for all but naked cartels and replaced with de facto presumptive
legality under the rule of reason or even per se legality.
